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Abstract: The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) caused new application needs to emerge
as rapid response ability is missing in the current IoT end-devices. Therefore, Fog Computing has
been proposed to be an edge component for the IoT networks as a remedy to this problem. In recent
times, cyber-attacks are on the rise, especially towards infrastructure-less networks, such as IoT.
Many botnet attack variants (Mirai, Torii, etc.) have shown that the tiny microdevices at the lower
spectrum of the network are becoming a valued participant of a botnet, for further executing more
sophisticated attacks against infrastructural networks. As such, the fog devices also need to be secured
against cyber-attacks, not only software-wise, but also from hardware alterations and manipulations.
Hence, this article first highlights the importance and benefits of fog computing for IoT networks,
then investigates the means of providing hardware security to these devices with an enriched
literature review, including but not limited to Hardware Security Module, Physically Unclonable
Function, System on a Chip, and Tamper Resistant Memory.
Keywords: cloud; edge; fog; IoT; IIoT; privacy; protection; HSM; PUF; TRM; SoC
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is having its boom phase now, as the Internet had two decades ago.
The IoT market is growing and expected to increase from more than 15 billion devices in 2016 to more
than 75 billion by 2025 [1]. Following this trend, the number of deployed IoT devices has already
passed the total population of Earth. Furthermore, in the last decade, the proliferation of mobile
computing has expanded exponentially. It is expected to continue its pace this way to result in each
person on Earth having an average of six connected devices [2]. In order to keep this rapid growth
and the huge consumer market it possesses, IoT needs a rigid technological foundation supported
by the scientific community. Fog computing is a very strong candidate to provide this foundation
(in parts or totally) for IoT, by providing several advantages, in terms of computational, architectural,
and networking point of view [3].
Emerging from recent trends and needs, cloud computing and IoT will serve as complementary
technologies of the Internet in the near future, by forming the concept called Cloud of Things (CoT).
CoT will be leveraged as Things as a Service (TaaS) for cloud based IoT applications, for offloading
high energy consuming tasks and operations to the cloud. TaaS will support innovative scenarios and
use cases, breath-taking services along with ubiquitous and value added applications to enable CoT to
be accessible by the users. In the meantime, fog computing and all virtual/real services associated
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with it can be thought of an intermediate layer to rapidly process the data at the edge of the network,
serving the fast response need of the agile applications [2,4].
The fog layer can also leveraged as the security layer to provide necessary privacy and security
functions to protect the data before it is offloaded to the cloud through insecure and vulnerable
channel [2].
1.1. Why Security Is Crucial for IoT and Fog?
As being a centralized resource out of users’ reach and control, the cloud computing environment
represents every possible opportunity to violate user privacy. Undoubtedly, privacy is becoming a
desired luxury today, a situation that will be exacerbated with the proliferation of the IoT devices
everywhere surrounding us [5]. We have started to observe more IoT security related news than ever.
For instance, Mirai and its’ variant botnet attacks have shown that IoT botnets can be very effective
with large-scale deployments to execute Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Recently, Japan
announced that 200 million deployed IoT devices were going to be investigated by white-hat hackers.
These detectives will try to log into devices which are accessible through the Internet by using publicly
known default credentials. In order to foresee and identify unexpected cyber-security threats towards
IoT, this security trial is scheduled to happen in March 2020, just before the Summer Olympics in
Tokyo [6].
As discussed in this text, fog computing is also becoming an integrated part of the IoT networks.
Hence, the privacy issues are not solved with it but maybe multiplied—in terms of complexity—the
ownership of the data that is being produced, transferred, and processed. Therefore, this article
investigates the remedy that is needed to address the privacy and security concerns of the users in fog
computing supported IoT networks.
1.2. Which One Should Be Preferred for IoT: Cloud, Mobile-Edge, or Fog?
In recent years, due to the usage of IoT and other sensors, the data generated by end-devices
increased massively. The question is where, when, and how should these data be analyzed.
In cloud-centric design, the cloud server operates as a central server. IoT devices generate the data
and send them to the cloud for storage and analysis. Large-scale IoT deployments create situations
which cloud computing could not handle efficiently and effectively.
However, in fog computing, the data are to be analyzed on the edge stations and just necessary
results (summaries) are being sent to the cloud server for further analysis and storage. For instance,
applications which require low latency while processing the data on the edge of the network might
benefit from this technology. The data analysis could be done on site by running the software at local
stations. The cloud would still be used as storing the analysis result for historical and audit purposes.
The data aggregation will reduce the bandwidth and also bandwidth related cost.
The fog computing concept was introduced by CISCO [7] and was a vision that enabled IoT
devices to run on the edge of the network. According to Bonomi et al. [8], fog computing is not an
alternative for cloud computing; instead, fog extends and complements the cloud computing with the
concept of smart devices which can work on the edge of the network.
In IoT, with different types of data generated by various heterogeneous nodes, inseparability
issues arise as an important problem. Fog computing can provide remedies to this problem by handling
trans-coding related specific tasks at the edge of the network [2].
As shown in Figure 1, fog computing can be thought of a gateway between cloud computing
and IoT, for the sake of enhancing the Quality of Service (QoS) in some specific applications such
as Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), where rapid and agile response is of prime importance.
Fog computing also projected to provide remedies to long known problems and challenges of the cloud,
namely: data aggregation and processing from heterogeneous devices along with interoperability
issues of those devices; data protection and security of the sensitive user data; context-aware and
location-aware service provisioning especially for the location-based services (LBS).
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Figure 1. Fog computing as a gateway in between cloud computing and IoT.
The use of the cloud paradigm is where data need to be collected first and transmitted to a
central location to store and analyze later due to hardware constraints on edge. The Fog/Mobile-Edge
paradigm is preferred when data are collected on the edge and needs to be processed immediately to
eliminate latency or preserve availability. For instance, in avionics concepts, the cloud paradigm is
preferred with space crafts and orbital satellites since, due to hardware limitations, data are collected
on the edge and transmitted to earth for storage and further data analysis. In the case of commercial
airlines, fog/mobile-edge would be advantageous since various analog sensors were deployed to the
plane and need to be digitized to feed mission computer and inform pilots for decision. Therefore,
data need to be consumed on edge rather than transmitting to a central location to get decisions.
1.3. Why Hardware Assisted Security for Fog?
The proliferation of IoT devices such as sensors has resulted in high data bandwidth demand
from the IoT network to the cloud due to the vast amount of data being produced and transferred.
Fog computing is proposed to provide a remedy to this challenging and growing problem: Instead
of transferring all of the IoT data to the cloud, fog computing will process the data at the edge.
Fog computing brings most of the advantages and benefits that cloud computing offers down to the
edge of the network that will be available to IoT end-devices and users. However, this integration
will bring many new challenges for the researchers, especially while building cyber-security related
solutions. Therefore, this integration needs to be supported from the cyber-security point of view.
One way of doing is leveraging commodity hardware security platforms such as Hardware Security
Module (HSM) and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). This article investigates efficient and
seamless implementations of this kind.
1.4. Demystifying Fog Computing
In an earlier publication [9], we have mentioned the security implications of fog computing for
IoT networks. Here, in this manuscript, we focus on the fog computing devices and, to enhance the
security of those, we stress more about the hardware platforms that can be leveraged.
As shown in Figure 1, from a conceptual point of view, fog computing might be expected to serve
as an intermediate level of service for flawlessly handshaking the protocols of cloud computing and
IoT. Sometimes, this service is referred to as Fog as a Service (FaaS) in the literature. FaaS will bring
many benefits to IoT and its users: (1) Servers of the cloud computing are super fast when compared to
the IoT end-devices. Fog Computing Gateways (FCGs) would provide an interface between the two far
sets of those devices. (2) This intermediate layer of fog computing would allow necessary fixes (such as
patch management, etc.) to be done easier and remotely. Instead of making the configurations on IoT
end-devices by plugging-in physically, software updates can be pushed on to the fog gateways which
Sensors 2020, 20, 5729 4 of 25
then deliver the patches to intended end-devices. (3) Fog computing will bring all the advantages of
edge-computing to the IoT, such as the agility, scalability, decentralization, etc. (4) Fog will expand
clouds to provide additional assets to the underlying nodes and networks by taking advantage of
virtualization concept by creating virtual sensors and networks to be used by other various services.
(5) Finally, fog enables and creates an environment for proliferation of distributed IoT applications.
1.5. Content and Scope
In this article, our aim is to find, identify, and discuss available COTS and/or conceptual hardware
solutions for securing low-end devices of fog-based IoT networks. To facilitate this, we first presented
the fog computing concept and the advantages it would bring to IoT networks. Cyber threats against
IoT networks are presented in Section 2.4, and the hardware attacks are in Section 4.1. Implications of
using fog-computing based IoT networks are presented. This is followed by the remedies that would
be offered by hardware assisted security techniques such as TRM, PUF, HSM, etc. This is followed
by practical real-life scenarios in which fog based IoT networks can be supported by hardware-based
cyber-security solutions.
1.6. Organization
The rest of the manuscript is provided as follows: Section 2 presents the concepts of fog,
mobile-edge and cloud computing in a comparative way. Section 3 discusses the implications of
using fog computing for IoT in terms of systems integration, cost, QoS, consumer needs, and security.
Hardware assisted security solutions for fog computing devices are discussed in Section 4. Some
practical application scenarios of fog computing supported IoT network are presented in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper along with future remarks.
2. Fog vs. Cloud/Mobile-Edge Computing
Major distinctions between cloud, fog and mobile-edge computing are provided in Munir et al.’s
work [10], Stallings’ work [11], and Luan et al.’s work [12]. We extended all these as discussed below
and tabulated them as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of cloud and fog and mobile-edge computing concepts [13].
Feature Cloud Mobile-Edge Fog
Access to the network Wired (mostly fiber) Wireless Wireless (cellular,
via or wireless (mostly cellular) WiMAX, IEEE802.15, LPWAN, etc.)
Access to the service Through server Through BS * At the FCG *
Agility Slow Fast Fastest
Availability Mostly available Mostly available Mostly volatile
Bandwidth usage High Medium Low
Capacity—Computing High Medium Low
Capacity—Storage High Medium Low
Connectivity Internet Many protocols (Figure 3) Many protocols (Figure 3)
Content distributed to Edge device Restricted to BS coverage Anywhere
Content generator Man made Mixed Sensor made
Content generation at Central server BS FCG
Control Centralized Distributed till BSs Distributed
Data analysis Long term Instant/Short term Instant/Short term
Latency High Moderate Low
Processing/storage at Center (Server) Mobile-Edge (BS) Edge (FCG)
Scalability (Horizontal +) High Medium Low
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Table 1. Cont.
Feature Cloud Mobile-Edge Fog
Scalability (Vertical ±) High Medium Low
Security Weaker Stronger Stronger
Mobility Not supported Supported Supported
Number of users Billions Millions/Billions Millions/Billions
Virtual infrastructure at Enterprise server Main server User devices
* BS: Base Station, FCG: Fog Computing Gateway. + By adding more machine. ± By adding more hardware
(CPU, RAM, Storage, etc.).
2.1. Fog vs. Cloud Computing
Fog and cloud computing are different paradigms; they are not rivals but complimentary to
each other to build up a stronger and agile network. The basic trade-offs between fog and cloud are
provided in Aazam et al. [2] as follows:
• communication efficiency
• total power consumption for a service
• round-trip response time for a query or task.
Here, we extend this list as follows:
• Place of data processing: Fog computing implements the idea of bringing the functionalities of
cloud computing to the data source. This is an analogy to meteorology, as fog is simply a type
of cloud that is closer to earth. Henceforth, fog computing extends the services of the cloud
computing downward towards the edge of the network.
• Proximity to the users: FCGs are very close to the IoT users and end-devices, whereas cloud
computing is executed over servers located at far side from the IoT users.
• Network delay: The cloud computing servers are most generally at least several hops away
from the IoT users and end-devices. Therefore, in some cases, a round trip of communication
(bi-directional) may last in the neighborhood of seconds. On the contrary, owing to the off loaded
server architecture, fog computing may receive and respond the queries from the IoT network in
milliseconds. Henceforth, they are very promising for agile applications such as IIoT and CPS.
• Location-Based Services (LBS): One of the major benefits of fog computing over the cloud is
that the support for location awareness which might be very useful for the applications that are
employing LBS.
• Mobility Support: Mobility is fully supported in fog computing by leveraging virtual machine
(VM) technologies. However, for cloud computing, mobility of the users is supported in a very
limited way.
2.2. Fog vs. Mobile-Edge Computing
Due to a misconception, fog computing and mobile-edge computing are sometimes being used
interchangeably in the literature. However, they differ in the following ways:
• Decentralization: Fog computing provides more decentralized and distributed architecture when
compared to mobile-edge computing in which generally cellular base stations are the main point
of centralization.
• Supplier diversity: In mobile-edge computing, the hardware/software components are supplier
specific and there is no standardization in the market. For fog computing, this is not acceptable.
System cost, quality, innovation, market adoption and proliferation of fog computing are all
dependent on standardization.
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• Diverse Radio Access: Most of the mobile-edge computing applications are for mobile and/or
cellular networks, whereas fog computing will include WiFi, LPWAN, and WiMax additional to
the cellular network.
Connectivity of large number of IoT devices and various latency requirements of them will be
seamlessly supported by the massive Machine Type Communication (MTC). Non-Orthogonal Multiple
Access (NOMA) technology, and, more specifically, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) has the advantages
of improving network capacity, reducing MTC devices’ latency, and enhancing Quality of Service
(QoS) [14].
2.3. Advantages of Using Fog Computing for IoT
Table 1 presented fog, mobile-edge, and cloud computing concepts in a comparative way. As can
be seen, fog computing presents a more agile and rapid response when compared to mobile-edge and
cloud computing, thereby represents a strong candidate as a technological solution for future IoT and
IIoT based implementations.
As mentioned earlier, fog computing can be considered as an extension of the cloud computing
towards the edge of the IoT network with an increased agility. Thereby, fog computing offers the
following advantages when used for IoT (and IIoT) networks:
• Cost efficiency: The data will be processed on edge rather than cloud which will eventually
decrease transportation of huge amount of data to the cloud along with the associated cost.
• Support for interoperability: Fog devices can help with trans-coding related tasks to relieve the
problem of the interoperability of the heterogeneous IoT end-devices [2].
• Reduced delay: The cloud computing is not suitable to serve for time-critical applications such as
for IIoT, as overall end-to-end delay is in the neighborhood of 100 ms (which is critically high,
especially for factory automation that require isochronous response in the low milliseconds [15]).
As being located at the edge of the network, fog computing is a strong candidate to provide faster
communication and thereby reduced delay for the communication packets.
• Agile response: Real-time applications, such as IIoT, may benefit from the fog computing
concept to gain agility during analysis and decision-making phases of their overall process
automation cycle.
• Increased security: With fog computing, service providers can easily filter out sensitive personally
identifiable information (PII) and process them locally. Instead of sending all the information,
only the non-sensitive information is sent to the cloud for further processing [16].
2.4. Cyber-Attacks and Ways of Protecting the Networks from Them
In the literature, many attacks have been identified in IoT networks such as Mirai and Torii botnet
attacks [9], and various attacks against industrial networks (IIoT, etc.) such as Stealthy attacks [17].
Henceforth, in order to have solid and operable systems and to cope with cyber-attacks, cyber-security
measures need to be taken. As mentioned in Butun et al. [18], cyber-security of any computer system
consists of three layers: Prevention, Detection, and Mitigation.
On the intrusion detection side, anomaly detection is a very commonly used technique. Anomaly
detection based on device or event logs and process model (cyber threats and faults) is another
important aspect to prevent possible attack vectors crafted for the targeted systems. For instance,
Audi investigated the intruder detection and monitoring approaches to secure the Industrial Control
Systems based on anomaly detection [19]. In a similar work on industrial networks, Myers proposed
a method to detect cyber attacks on industrial control systems using process mining [20]. However,
MITM, hardware hijacking, etc. attacks are omitted in this study. In another work, Aydogan
et al. [21] investigated intrusion detection systems under Hello flood and Version number attacks for
RPL-based IIoT.
In Greenberg et al. [22], the following statement is really disconcerting: “A new proof-of-concept
hardware implant shows how easy it may be to hide malicious chips inside IT equipment.” This is a
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very good proof showing that, not only the software systems, but also commodity hardware platforms
are vulnerable to attacks. These are sometimes also referred to as ‘hardware-hacks’ and remind system
developers to include hardware level authenticity validations right after factory production line,
followed by before and after installment validation procedures.
This work focuses on the Prevention mechanisms to thwart attackers in the first place before any
attack can happen. On the cyber-prevention side, trusted hardware components might be utilized:
Smart Environment Monitoring (SEN) systems are on the rise and many various applications are being
developed to monitor sensed environment data via IoT [23]. Hence, the reliability of these data is
important and supports our standing point here, as trusted hardware platforms can fulfill the necessity
of ‘reliable data’.
2.5. Why Is Security in Fog Computing Needed?
Fog computing is actually a tool for Cloud-Based Services (CBS) that can be imagined as an
interface between the real end-devices of the IoT and the rest of the CBS. As discussed in Butun
et al. [24], CBS offers three major service components, namely Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). We are projecting that fog computing
paradigm will extend this presentation by including Fog as a Service (FaaS) as the 4th component to
the service model as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Representation of “Fog as a Service” model.
The Security Plane for CBS proposed by Butun et al. [24] was devised to be used at the front-end
IoT devices and to provide an interface to the cloud. After the proposal of fog computing, this Security
Plane solution is more diverse and layered compared to an earlier version (see Figure 2). Therefore,
we think of fog computing to provide extra services such as security to the edge of the cloud for the
CBS. For example, the usage of fog computing would bring benefits to the Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) that are devised for IoT. Hence, early detection is important to stop the ill effects of intrusions,
fog computing would bring early detection opportunities to IDS algorithms working on IoT. It is
worthwhile to mention that the security plane of Figure 2 will be incomplete, unless all necessary
security and privacy functionalities are implemented accordingly.
3. Implications of Fog Computing Usage in IoT
According to the scientific projections, fog computing is expected to be one of the main backbone
pillars of the IoT in the near future transforming the cloud computing based IoTs to a more distributed
architecture [1,16,25]. Inevitably, there will be some implications of this transformation as follows:
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3.1. Related to Systems and/or Subsystems Integration
Systems and/or subsystems integration is an important task for the systems engineers as their
duty is to provide all components of a newly built system to work seamlessly. As such, the introduced
system (the IoT security components, etc. in our case) should be both compatible with cloud computing
servers from the high-end, and also with the IoT end-devices (sensors and actuators) from the low-end.
It should not create an extra burden for network managers in setting up and configuring the fog
computing devices.
3.2. Related to Telecommunications
Table 2 shows the IoT related telecommunication (RF) technologies in a comprehensive manner.
The selection of the RF technologies can be based on the intended functionality and on the hardware
requirements such as bandwidth, cost, energy efficiency, latency, and network type, etc. As discussed
in Figure 3, these RF technologies establish the foundation for the IoT networking technologies.
The details of these communication and networking technologies are beyond the scope of this article
(Interested audience may refer to [13] for further reading).
Figure 3. IoT connectivity diagram [26].
Besides the great benefits of having a diverse spectrum of RF technologies, orchestration of
these technologies and making them work in harmony require tremendous effort, especially from
the cyber-security point of view. Hence, one of the goals of this paper is shedding light on the
cyber-security related dark spots of the fog-computing associated technologies.
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Table 2. Various RF communication technologies for IoT.
Technology Standard Frequency Penetration Range Max Data Rate Channel Bandwidth Chipset Cost
NFC/RFID ISO/ICE 18092 13.56 MHz High <20 cm 424 kbps 106–424 Mbps $0.1+
Bluetooth IEEE 802.15 2.4/2.5 GHz Low 50–100 m 2 Mbps 2 MHz $5+
Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11 2.4/5.0 GHz Low 100 m 54 Mbps 22 MHz $1.5-30+
Zigbee IEEE 802.15.4 868/915 MHz, 2.4 GHz Low/High <1 km 250 kbps 2 MHz $2-20+
DASH7 ISO/IEC 18000-7 433/868/915 MHz High 0–5 km 167 kbps up to 1.75 MHz $3.00+
Weightless Weightless P/N/W Multiple Low/High 5 km 100 kbps 200 Hz–12.5 KHz ∼$2.00
LoRa Various 868/915 MHz Low 25 km 50 kbps 125/250/500 kHz ∼$2.00
Ingenu-RPMA Ingenu-RPMA 2.4 GHz Low 15 km 20 kbps 1 MHz rental
SigFox SigFox 915–928 MHz Low/High 40 km 100 bps 100 Hz $0.25+
3G UMTS/W-CDMA 0.4–3 GHz Low/High 5–35 km 0.38–21.6 Mbps 3.6–21 Mbps varies
4G/LTE 3GPP-LTE 0.6–6 GHz Low/High 5–100 km 100–300 Mbps 100 Mbps+ $6.5+
5G 5GTF/5G-SIG 0.6–4/100 GHz Low/High 5–150 km 10 Gbps 500 Mbps+ $70+
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3.3. Related to Cost
Recently, United Parcel Service (UPS) deployed IoT sensors to collect data for data analysis and
optimization to reduce the cost and to improve the efficiency in their postal distribution system [27].
According to Jalali et al. [28], fog computing may help to reduce the energy cost in cloud computing
systems. Therefore, we foresee that fog computing will help cloud computing-supported IoT systems
to decrease their overall system costs. As the data will be processed on edge rather than the cloud,
fog would reduce cost overheads of transmitting data to the cloud. This will have two benefits:
(1) Bandwidth usage of the transmission will decrease drastically. (2) The size of the data storage at the
cloud (along with the processing) will decrease.
3.4. Related to QoS
QoS is an important service criteria that eventually affects the satisfaction of the users while
using the provided service. For IoT, the temporary unavailability of the sensors or actuators within
IoT applications will directly impact the physical world and hence drastically decrease the QoS for
the network users [5]. Many existing wireless applications have diverse and mandated quality of
service (QoS) requirements, which complicates the burden on the integration of IoT and cloud. In the
meantime, emerging fog based middle-ware solutions might be useful and handy in that sense to offer
handling of urgent tasks at the edge of the network and offloading data from energy scarce nodes [2].
As mentioned in Lai et al. [29] and Yi et al. [30], fog computing can drastically improve the QoS of
IoT networks by decreasing the ‘packet latency’ and ‘network congestion’ while increasing the ‘failure
detection’ and ‘loss recovery’.
3.5. Related to Security
The real-life environment practically differs from ideal settings. Extra features and components
sometimes create single point of failures or put toil (e.g., processing, memory storage, power
consumption, etc.) on the existing system. In well designed and planned implementations, single
point of failures and the toil on the system can be eliminated to improve overall system performance as
desired. This is valid for both hardware, software and security features associated with the inclusion
of an extra component.
Several key security considerations for cloud-based IoT networks were addressed by
Singh et al. [31], which focused on security-related to IoT and cloud integration such as auditing,
software issues, policy, protocols, trust, etc. However, they did not touch any of the security problems
from the hardware perspective.
Security implications of using fog computing for IoT systems are described below. There are
6 features that we considered in case of a capture of the FCG device:
1. Access Control: FCG connects IoT/IIoT networks and cloud with a bidirectional communication
channel. The data are collected and streamed from IoT devices to cloud, and decision and
command messages sent from cloud to IoT networks. An FCG device can manage all connect IoT
devices in an efficient manner. However, FCG devices can not directly access to databases and
other computational resources without a designated cloud service.
2. Authentication: An FCG device may have some implications based on the selected authentication
algorithm. If the authentication is designed to operate by just FCG devices, it increases the risk of
getting all the IoT network being compromised once the FCG device is hacked. Usually two-factor
authentication and multi-layered authentication (one at FCG, one at the cloud, etc.) mitigates
the risk of an FCG is being compromised. In case of an incident, only a subset of connected IoT
devices would be effected.
3. Availability: Cloud resources are more resistant to single point of failures. Data are replicated on
multiple nodes on cloud and a fail over event can be achieved seamlessly. However, IoT devices
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are more susceptible to disruptions such as if any communications are blocked for IoT resources,
it may cause a significant impact on availability based on the critical location of the FCG.
4. Confidentiality: Compared to cloud, the data confidentiality on FCG has a moderate impact.
The devices connected to FCG has impacted directly, but the rest of the IoT devices and cloud
should not be impacted by it.
5. Integrity: Based on the selected communications scheme, the minor effect of a FCG capture on
the integrity of the messages is expected if end-to-end encryption is not employed, to no effect if
encryption is employed.
6. Privacy: Any data leak and privacy violation of users in IoT networks via an FCG device is a
serious problem not limited to reputation, financial loss, or other implications to organizations.
Any user which is using an IoT device or stored data on IoT device would get exposed via a
hacked FCG device. However, the private data on cloud would not get impacted with this.
All the communication between the cloud and IoT is flowing through FCGs. Therefore,
an adequate amount of computers need to be installed to prevent a single point of failures and
handle self-heals and fail-over events seamlessly. Since all the data flow would be blocked in case
of any damage or a physical attack, we suggest several FCGs to be installed in the fog computing
supported IoT network architectures with the capability of self-healing and seamless fail-over.
A compromised FCG affects both the IoT network and cloud layer at low to critical levels
depending on the situation and security mechanisms implemented which are explained above.
The security of FCG is important and should not be negligent to leave unprotected. As the next
section summarizes (see Section 4), hardware assisted security should be leveraged to add on FCG as
an additional defence layer on top of software oriented solutions.
Firewall and/or IDS components should be integrated into the fog layer to implement a
preemptive security mechanism. A well configured firewall can prevent most of the attacks and
an IDS can detect anomalies in the network to detect intrusion attempts. IDS can also be utilized with
different technologies like Markov model, virtual honeypot device, etc. [32]. Moreover, the anomaly
detection concept using various components such as autoencoders and neural networks to apply deep
learning algorithms to identify new trends on edge could be another defense layer variation for the
IoT network [33]. Therefore, leveraging security service prevents a propagation of attacks further to
the cloud.
The practice of just sending the minimal amount of data to the cloud and keeping data on the
edge would mitigate data privacy and security related issues.
4. Hardware Assisted Security of Fog Computing Devices
Arias et al. [34] introduced a case study that concluded that a non-secure hardware platform
would lead to a non-secure software stack, hence highlighting the importance of hardware security.
Kaur et al. [35] also mentioned that “Hardware Security” is not well studied in the literature
when compared to software-related cyber-security problems and solutions. Recently, there are
emerging studies on hardware assisted security on IoT related devices such as: building a unified
identity verification framework based on PUFs [36], FPGA hardware security for data centers [37],
and re-configurable hardware-based isolation and protection mechanism (IPM) for IoT devices
using cloud [38]. All these support our effort in introducing hardware security measures for FCGs.
This section summarizes all possible hardware security measures that can be considered for the FCGs,
while deciding security provisioning for the overall IoT network:
4.1. Threat Model and Security Risk Analysis
As discussed in Skorobogatov et al. [39], cyber-security attacks against hardware platforms can
be investigated under three groups: invasive, non-invasive, and semi-invasive. Among these, the most
severe one is the invasive one as it directly intervenes with the operational structure of the circuits on
the hardware. Figure 4 shows further details and classifications of these attacks.
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Figure 4. A subset of hardware related attack vectors and their relations [39].
The reverse engineering method is used to uncover the hardware’s physical properties and
functionalities to reproduce the technology or exploit possible vulnerabilities. Power analysis and
eavesdropping techniques can be correlated with RE to learn more about target hardware’s properties.
These attacks are mostly used in industrial espionage to steal competitors technology. Microprobing
and chip modifications are also used for monitoring and manipulating the hardware unit while
interfering with the integrated circuit directly. Software attacks target code level vulnerabilities or
weaknesses including business logic and code implementations, etc. Fault injection or generation can
be used to violate the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) principle such as making a device to
malfunction to gain access, stop functioning, or perform other critical tasks. Glitch attacks like clock or
power glitches can be used create a possible vulnerability window to perform a specially crafted attack.
Data remanence is the concept of deciphering information bits in physical devices like memory (SRAM,
DRAM, EPROM, etc.) and storage units to retrieve security keys or other critical information bits.
The focus of hardware security should be at least addressing C (Confidentiality) and I (Integrity).
Hidden information about the device or data should not be exposed and tampering should be prevented.
In the industry, secret information (property, data) is commonly attached to a physical object and
hardware must protect it. As an example, smart cards are used for multiple tasks such as accessing
a facility or keeping monetary information, etc. and a simple cloning attack may have an immediate
impact [9]. In the case of cloning being successful for bank cards, the financial loss would be devastating.
Generally, the following techniques can be considered to prevent or slow down hardware related
attacks as the first layer of the defense; obfuscation: data (deletion or nulling out, encryption, masking,
substitution, shuffling and other complex techniques, etc.), layout (by using 3D stacking and complex
architectural design to protect chip integrity) and metal mesh (to prevent probing attacks). Finally,
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using physical shields to protect hardware from outside noises to prevent fault injection attacks.
Table 3 shows security risk analysis for hardware cyber-threats vs. common security properties
for fog-computing based IoT end-devices including attack vector classification [40]. For instance,
a security risk analysis of rogue end-device (i.e., a captured end-device by the adversaries) with
respect to common security properties is as follows: C has moderate, I has moderate, A has moderate,
and Auth* has significant impact. The associated attack vector is In or S.
Table 3. Security risk analysis for hardware cyber-threats vs. common security properties for
fog-computing based IoT end-devices including attack vector classification. Legend: C: Confidentiality,
I: Integrity, A: Availability, Auth*: Authentication & Access Control, In: Invasive, NI: Non-Invasive, S:
Semi-Invasive.
Threat Category
Severity of the Risk
Vector
C I A Auth *
Destroy, remove or steal end-device None None Moderate None NI
Device cloning Moderate Moderate Minimal Significant In
Firmware replacement Moderate Moderate Minimal Significant In
Security parameter extraction by phy. access Moderate Minimal Minimal Significant In
Jamming Minimal Minimal Significant Minimal NI
Rogue end-device Moderate Moderate Moderate Significant In/S
Bit-flipping Minimal Moderate Minimal Minimal In
It has been observed in this subsection that there are several obstacles to be tackled in order to
accommodate cyber-security for fog-based IoT devices via hardware-assisted solutions due to inherent
problems of the IoT and the end-devices themselves: Physical access vs. remote access (hardware
solutions would require physical access to the real device which sometimes might bring a real burden
on the field teams/technicians), flexibility (hardware systems are not very much flexible as software
systems; although some hardware platforms are re-configurable such as FPGAs, they are very costly in
that form), scalability (due to hardware limitations, cost, and other production constraints’ hardware
solutions are hard to scale), agility (time required to install hardware fixes might be significant).
4.2. Resistance against Reverse Engineering (RE)
‘Tamper resistance’ means that taking measures to make Reverse Engineering (RE) harder for
attackers or to prevent them from modifying a product against the producer’s will. This can be
achieved in three ways:
4.2.1. By-Software
Software solution for tamper resistance would contain ways of shuffling the executable code on
the memory so that it would not reveal specific information regarding any confidential and meaningful
material to the attackers. One commonly used method for doing this is code obfuscation [41].
Historically, white box implementation [42], dynamic program monitoring [43], self-hashing [44],
and check-summing [45] are provided as methods for tamper resistance. Finally, blockchain technology
is a viable option to satisfy data integrity in the IoT network using consensus [46] strategy between
nodes. As a proof of concept, a scheme of blockchain integrated PUFs in IoT is proposed in [47], using a
unique consensus algorithm called “Proof of PUF-Enabled Authentication”.
4.2.2. By-Hardware
The discussion on attack vectors against cryptographic hardware (smart cards and micro-
controllers) and the need of tamper proof systems dates back to the 1990s [48]. Chip-based protection
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is also designed to protect intellectual property. Game console, phone, or other device hacks to run
illegal copies of the software the designated device is another motivation for tamper proof systems [49].
A subset of known attack vectors to hardware are differential fault analysis, chip rewriting, memory
remanence, and protocol failures [50]. Logic locking of Boolean circuits can be used as a preventative
method [51].
Tamper Resistant Memory (TRM) chips may be designed to delete their sensitive data including
cryptographic keys, if they can detect an intrusion towards their security encapsulation. The working
mechanism behind this is continuously updating the memory cells to prevent static data imprint
on them. TRM is mostly used to store sensitive information like private keys, electronic payment
information, etc.
Another approach would be implementation of a hardware-based System on a Chip (SoC) concept.
For instance, Da Silva et al. [52] proposed an SoC to protect low-end embedded processors from control
flow attacks, especially from the Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs). The proposed concept provides an
end-to-end protection combination of detection, response, recovery, and tamper evident techniques
against control flow violation (caused by CRAs), especially in the presence of interrupts, real-time
operating systems, and exceptional functions.
4.2.3. By-Design
IoT frameworks are dependent on underlying hardware and smart electronics as gateway devices
such as sensors and micro-controllers. These may be subjected to malicious Hardware Trojan (HT)
inserted by the untrusted chip manufacturers. An HT is strategically inserted into normal looking
hardware by using RE skills and acts as time-bomb: It is suddenly activated during a normal operation
mode of the hardware, and may cause abnormal and unintended operation. Defense against this kind
of attack can be one of the popular techniques such as ‘functional and structural obfuscation’ which is
executed by the authentic device manufacturers before the fabrication phase of the chips. HT also can
inject faults to create DoS attacks to starve the target network [53]. HT detection is quite challenging
due to involvement of many third party intellectual property related to manufacturing business [54].
4.3. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF)
PUF is a physical object which provides a digital fingerprint for hardware like microprocessors
based on various inputs and challenges. Silicon circuits manufacturing results with unique
characteristics of the products which can not be physically cloned [55]. Each PUF circuit should
have a unique Challenge Response Pair (CRP) which can be used for identification and authentication
purposes [56,57]. Fabrication and architectural details of weak (has small number of CRPs) [58,59] and
strong (has lots of CRPs) [59] PUFs are also important. Strong PUFs are resistant to brute force attacks.
The main characteristics of PUFs are reliability (it should always provide same CRPs), unpredictability
(PUF CRPs should not be predicted based on other CRPs), unclonability (CRP mappings should
be physically unclonable), and physical unbreakability (physical PUF modification should result of
malfunction or permanent damage to chip as protection of chip integrity) [60]. Advantages of the
PUFs are resistant to invasive attacks and have no need for extra programming, testing, and processing
power [61].
SRAM cells are resistant to circuit degradation and can be used to build reliable SRAM based
PUFs which can be used for authentication and secret key generation [62–64]. Huang and Wang [36]
have shown that PUF can be utilized for identity verification in order to secure IoT hardware via
device authentication. This is achieved by improving a configurable ring oscillator (CRO) PUFs with
the latch structure. A unique sub-digital signature of each chip can be generated by performing the
challenge-response strategy via CRO-based PUF.
The analysis of PUFs revealed that an exponential improvement will happen soon in the chip area
and energy efficiency due to the research efforts [65].
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It has been shown in Huth et al. [66] that PUFs can be leveraged by IoT devices to ensure IP
protection during software update procedures. Accordingly, an IoT end-device has to prove the erasure
of its memory within a time constraint and a PUF binds the newly downloaded software IP to the
target platform. Usage of PUFs promises an increase in the security level of the IoT, by enabling
low-level security implementations on the things and also by devising cryptography algorithms to
perform special tasks (e.g., verification, etc.) [67]. In a similar fashion, fog computing can leverage
PUFs that are embedded to the fog gateways and/or IoT end-devices, in order to ensure IP protection
during patch updates.
PUF based vulnerabilities in IoT have been studied in many publications [55,68]. Man In The
Middle (MITM) attacks are presented in [69], and side-channel attacks in [70,71]. Moreover, improper
PUF implementations can result with a backdoor as discussed in [72,73]. All of these attacks mentioned
above are crafted for authentication and key generation phases.
4.4. Hardware Security Module (HSM)
HSM is a physical computing hardware that safeguards and coordinates digital keys for strong
authentication and provides foundations for crypto-processing. These modules are either presented
in the form of a plug-in card or an external portable device that can be attached directly to a
computer or network server. HSM units can be implemented at FCG’s of the fog computing based IoT
network to orchestrate not only the key distribution, but also cryptography related operations such as
authentication, encryption/decryption, etc.
There are various hardware configurations for IoT end-devices depending on the application they
are used for and also the wireless communication technology they are using. For instance, Bluetooth
LE, Sigfox, LoRa, WiFi, WiMAX, and NB-IoT are well known wireless communication technologies for
the IoT with the radio chip-sets available on the market. Therefore, hardware security solutions will
not be generic as they need to consider all the components that are being used in the system. As shown
in Figure 5, we project that the above-mentioned hardware security commodity solutions available on
the market can be a remedy in providing cyber security for the fog computing enabled IoT networks.
TRMs and PUFs are comparably cheaper hardware security solutions and can be used for end-devices
of the fog computing enabled IoT networks. However, HSMs are quite expensive devices and to be
preferably installed at the FCG’s of the IoT network.
Figure 5. Representation of “Hardware Assisted Security” for fog computing based IoT networks.
Logos/images are taken from: Bluetooth [74], Sigfox [75], LoRa [76], Wi-Fi [77], WiMAX [78],
NB-IoT [79], Libelium [80], and PI [81].
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4.5. Cost-Analysis of the Hardware Assisted Security
The famous quote by Benjamin Franklin says: “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
History has proven this to us many times; if a hardware-based security defense is forgotten and then
patched via software, this might not only be costly, but also would cause irreversible performance
degradation, or even worse side-effects such as partial or full burn-out of the mentioned hardware if
the software fix does not work. As in the case of Intel, a cyber-attack towards a hardware vulnerability
(so famed ‘Spectre’ and ‘Meltdown’ vulnerabilities) not only cost Intel millions of dollars (in fixing the
old processors via software patches and devising hardware/software prevention mechanism in the
newly designed processors) but also a performance degradation up to 15–20% in the software-patched
processors that are being used today [82].
In this paper, we do not present hardware-based cyber-security solutions as a replacement-for
or competitor to the software-based solutions; on the contrary, we offer hardware assisted security
principles along with the software ones. Therefore, they should not be considered as a competing
solution, but a complementary one. For instance, storing a password of a software based security
solution to a tamper-resistant memory chip. Moreover, one should also consider that hardware-based
cyber-security attacks are mostly (maybe completely) thwarted by hardware-based cyber-security
solutions not by the software-based ones.
4.6. Summary and Recommendations
As mentioned in this section, the PUF-based cyber-defense mechanism does not require intense
hardware resources when compared to other solutions such as hardware accelerated encryption, etc.
Henceforth, usage of PUF-base based cyber-defense mechanisms is preferably a good option for IoT
(FCGs and end-devices) security [68]. TRM chips should be used when trusted hardware needed
to ensure that security keys are not tampered with. TRM chips can give strong protection for cloud
data centers, mobile-edge, and Fog devices. However, counting on the cost-related benefits, software
solutions should be considered for large scale IoT deployments. HSM also can be used as an expensive
on-demand defense layer and to be preferably installed at the FCG’s of the IoT network.
5. Practical Application Scenarios of Fog Computing in IoT
During the past decade, reduced hardware cost has triggered a rapid increase and an enormous
improvement in consumer electronics. Low price microcontrollers and ARM processors are used
to design low cost single board computers. ARM is an RISC (reduced instruction set computer)
ISA (instruction set architecture) microprocessor widely used in mobile phones and IoT devices.
The PIC16(L)F184xx Products (8-bit microcontroller family from Microchip Technology Inc.) price is
between $0.53 and $1.04 when ordered bulk [83]. As an example, ARM Microcontroller MCU 32B
CORTEX-M3 32KB FL/8KB SRAM is sold on mouser.com for $3.20. Owing to the high demand on
IoT concept and its applications, single board computers such as Ardunio (Uno Rev3 is starting from
$22 on the martket), Raspberry Pi (Pi Zero starts at $5 on the market and Pi 3 Model B+ is available
for $35) or Pine64 (A64-LTS is $32.00 on the market) not only are being used by professionals for
commercial use, but are also being adopted by hobbyists for any kind of independent studies including
elementary-middle-high school projects. Table 4 shows a subset of well known COTS IoT hardware
options in a comprehensive manner.
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Table 4. Comparison of the specs for the subset of the available COTS IoT hardware devices.
Price Size Connectivity Computation Power CPU specs Memory Graphics Storage
MCU $0.1–20 Variuos N/A Limited 0.29 W Various N/A N/A N/A
Pi Zero $10–30 66 × 30.5 × 5 Bluetooth/LAN/Wifi Low 0.4–1.2 W *BCM2835 1 GHz 512 MB Videocore IV microSD
1 × microUSB
mini-HDMI
Pi 3 $30–60 85 × 56 × 17 Bluetooth/LAN/Wifi Medium 1–2 W 1.2 GHz quad-core 1 GB Videocore IV microSD
4 × USB, HDMI ARM Cortex-A53
Pine $15–29 133 × 80 × 19 10/100/1000 Mbps Medium 1.5–4.1 W 1.2 GHz quad-core 0.5–2 GB Dual Core Mali microSD
A64 Ethernet Port, ARM Cortex-A53 400 MP2
2 × USB 2.0 64bit
Rock64 $25–45 85 × 56 × 18.8 10/100/1000 Mbps Medium 1.5–4.1 W RK3328 Quad-Core 1/2/4 GB ARM Mali microSD
1 USB3.0 ARM Cortex A53 450MP2
2 USB2.0 64bit Dual-core
Jetson $600 17 × 17 × 5.1 Bluetooth/LAN/Wifi High 7.5–15 W Dual-Core Denver 2 8 GB 128-bit 256-core GPU eMMC 5.1
TX2 64-Bit LPDDR4 NVIDIA Pascal
Libelium $130 73.5 × 51 × 13 Mini USB Low < 15 W ATmega1281 N/A N/A SD Card
Arduino $11–77 Various Micro/Mini/Regular Low ≥ 0.29 W 8MHz to 400Mhz KB < 64 MB N/A EEPROM
USB
TelosB $99 81.9 × 32.5 × 6.55 USB Low ≥ 0.075 W 8 MHz TI MSP430 KB < 1 MB 10 KB Ext Flash
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Because of introducing agile response nearby the edge components, we are expecting fast
implementation and business growth of fog computing for future IoT applications such as Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), smart-factories, smart-cities, etc. Figure 6 presents various possible
application fields of fog computing, which are enlisted as follows:
Figure 6. An illustration of four different possible fog computing applications with IoT networks:
Smart Office, Smart Factory, Smart Home, and Intelligent Traffic System.
• Smart Homes/Offices: The smart home concept was introduced in 1975 once X10 technology is
developed in Scotland [84]. Currently, Zigbee or Z-wave are mostly used for home automation
applications. They are basically wireless mesh protocols. The latest Zigbee 3.0 enhances the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard by adding security layers. Z-Wave (800–900 MHz frequency) has
lower bandwidth than the other standards so it supports a longer distance than the other
standards/protocols (up to 100 m). Zigbee has 2.4 GHz frequency and a standard Wifi may
Sensors 2020, 20, 5729 19 of 25
have 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz. The higher frequency means a shorter distance for communication.
Security-wise, they all support encryption. A Z-Wave network can support a maximum of
232 nodes. (http://www.openzwave.com/dev/) and Z-Wave is limited to 232 devices. Zigbee
supports maximum 65,000 nodes connected in a network. Wifi varies based on the router used in a
network. To secure smart homes, a security framework utilizing network monitoring and anomaly
detection, etc. to address physical, network, and software attacks [85] should be considered.
• Smart Cities: Smart cities can incorporate with the ITS concept through the support of IoT and fog
computing to help a sustainable economic development of our world (energy/utility distribution,
etc.), safety, transportation (scheduling traffic, signalling systems, etc.), by contributing
decision-making with a localization concept. Collecting data from sensors city wide can result in
improvement in the efficiency of city services. A redundant task can be found and eliminated
(possible financial saving). The end result would be high-quality services at a lower cost.
As discussed in Butun et al. [86], smart cities will be vulnerable to many cyber attacks and
will need a robust security architecture, for which hardware security assisted fog computing can
be employed to help with.
• Smart Factories and Industrial IoT: Automation processes can be improved via data collection with
IoT sensors and analyzing these data on the fog environment. Work-flow audit and data collection
tasks can be easily accomplished via this methodology. This may result in possible optimization
opportunities in IIoT contexts as shown in Forsström et al. [87], in which maintenance prediction
or energy efficiency problems can be efficiently solved via the assistance of fog. As also mentioned
in Forsström et al. [87], security issues related to IIoT are also on arise and fog-computing based
agile cyber-security solutions might be a remedy to this. In addition, to address small and medium
sized enterprise needs, a hybrid (hardware-FPGA based middleware security layer, etc., software)
security solution should be considered [88].
• Smart Healthcare: IoT and fog can help with improving tools and frameworks in the health
industry. Financial improvement, security-surveillance, data collection, and critical medical
device-data coordination can benefit. Hardware security assisted fog computing can improve
the security of smart healthcare systems. For instance, digital patient records in the hospitals are
vulnerable to manipulation attacks. Currently, several vulnerabilities are reported related to the
networks and equipment used to transmit and store MRI and CT scan images, which are then
sent to radiology workstations through Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS).
The reason of the vulnerabilities is due to the absence of digital signatures and encryption on
images when they are stored on the PACS networks. Digital signatures can be attached to the
captured images right away at the scanning machines with the help of the fog computing devices
mentioned [89].
• Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS): ITS can be thought as a parent acronym for vehicular
networks and vehicular IoT networks. Fog computing is expected to enhance the coverage
and decrease the response time of ITS. As mentioned in Munir et al. [10], fog computing can
enhance the overall network performance by increasing the response time along with extended
coverage. Overall, ITS can benefit from fog computing to increase service quality in the following
example scenarios: rapid re-routing of the traffic, fast towing service, emergency services in case
of accidents, and, finally, providing necessary evacuation routes in extreme weather events such
as hurricanes.
In all of these different scenarios, the common idea is that the end-devices generate a massive
amount of data and may need to collaborate with each other to take critical decisions reducing the delay.
Hence, an agile response is important and the philosophy of fog computing may help to overcome
bandwidth and latency related problems in this manner.
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6. Conclusions and Future Directions
6.1. Lessons Learnt
The proliferation of consumer electronics yielded IoT devices and sensors to approach our close
proximity. This is an indispensable development and fog computing will make it further possible due
to the inherent advantages it possesses. Throughout this article, we have stressed the implications of
using fog computing as a backbone architecture for IoT, especially related to the cyber-security.
Centralized cloud data centers may fail while storing or processing requests from millions of
distributed IoT end-devices due to a congested network, high latency in the service, congestion in
limited bandwidth, etc. Therefore, as a remedy to this problem, the fog computing concept is projected
to be very useful, especially for delay-sensitive applications, such as industrial automation in IIoT.
Mobility support, geo-distribution, location awareness, and low latency concepts are important while
deploying IoT devices, and fog computing is a strong candidate to help in all of these topics.
This research also has taught us that hardware components of any system, especially
fog-computing related IoT systems, are not prone-to/free-from cyber-attacks/hacks/intrusions/
manipulations. Several cyber-attacks against hardware platforms are classified in this work along with
defense mechanisms in a summarized manner. As also mentioned by Alioto [65], stronger interaction
between chip designers and protocol developers will be indispensable for the next-generation IoT
devices to assure a desired level of security at a minimum energy/area cost while at the same time
enabling flexibility for future hardware patching.
6.2. Future Work
In this article, we discussed integration of fog computing to cloud-based IoT systems. In addition,
we elaborated that these IoT systems can leverage commodity hardware such as HSMs and PUFs,
or custom tailored SoC hardware, in order to enhance their defense mechanisms against cyber threats,
especially in protecting the PII of the users from RE attacks of the ill mannered adversaries.
We foresee that hardware-based cyber attacks will increase in the near future, especially against
embedded low-end devices. Thereby, hardware-based cyber-security solutions will be a very useful
tool defending against those attacks, more importantly for fog-computing infused IoT networks,
especially towards increasing the security abilities of low-end devices which do not have sufficient
software/hardware resources to defend themselves against cyber-threats.
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DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
FaaS Fog as a Service
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MEC Mobile Edge Computing
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QoS Quality of Service
RE Reverse Engineering
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computer
SaaS Software as a Service
SoC System on a Chip
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